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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate re%ned de%nition of random sequences. Classical de%nitions
(Martin-L;of tests of randomness, uncompressibility, unpredictability, or stochasticness) make use
of the notion of algorithm. We present alternative de%nitions based on set theory and explain why
they depend on the model of ZFC that is considered. We also present a possible generalization
of the de%nition when small in%nite regularities are allowed. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
Prolegomena
It is rather surprising that algorithms are involved for de%ning random sequences
since probability theory does not use the notion of algorithm. Thus, we try in this
paper to propose more general de%nitions based only on set theory. We %rst explain
why it is not so easy: we prove that perfect de%nitions (based on the notion of provably
null sets) cannot exist. Thus, we propose a weaker de%nition. We observe that there is
a model of ZFC (namely the Solovay model) in which our de%nition gives a perfect
notion of randomness. On the other hand, in all models of ZFC it gives a good notion
of randomness. Our paper is not focused on set theory, we just use some known set
theoretic results. We proposed that it is not necessary to be an expert on set theory
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to take advantage of new notions. Let us recall that our goal is to understand how
far the notion of algorithm is necessary to de%ne randomness and what kind of other
de%nition can be or cannot be proposed.
1. Introduction
If somebody tells us that he has tossed a coin in%nitely many times getting the
sequence
0001000101000100000001000101000001000101010 : : : ; (∗)
where each even term is 0, we will most likely be ready to suspect fraudulence.
Why? Our disbelief that the sequence is really random can be expressed in diJerent
terms: for instance, it contains too much regularities to be really random, or that it is
“predictable”, 3 or that it has more zeros than ones thus violating the Law of Large
Numbers, but essentially any explanation amounts to the following: the sequence is not
random because it belongs to a simply de=ned set of strings of Lebesgue measure 0.
Towards more rigorous presentation, let us de%ne =2N; the set of all in%nite
binary sequences. The Lebesgue, or uniform, measure in , denoted by mes, is the
product of N-many copies of the measure on the 2-element set {0; 1} giving the value
1
2 to both {0} and {1}. A null set is any set X ⊆ with mesX =0. Complements of
null sets, i.e., sets of measure 1, are full sets.
Coming back to the discussion above, we may conclude that a reasonable notion of
a random element of  must infer that random sequences avoid all “essential” null
sets in ; or, what is the same, must belong to all “essential” full sets. The key issue
is which sets should be viewed as “essential” here. Of course, these cannot be all (null
and full) sets, because then there would be no random sequences at all. As a matter
of fact, there is no other reasonable opportunity to provide the existence of random
sequences except for taking a countable family E of “essential” subsets of : Then,
we can de%ne a sequence x∈ to be random in the sense of E iJ it avoids any null
set X ∈E. The set R of all random sequences is, of course, full. The larger the family
E we take the more re%ned the notion of randomness we obtain and the stronger is
our belief that any random sequence can be obtained by fair coin tossing.
An important de%nition of this kind, given by Martin-L;of [?], is as follows. Let
u denote the set of all in%nite continuations of a %nite string u: Recall that A⊆
is a null set if it can be covered by an open set (in Cantor’s topology) of arbitrar-
ily small measure, that is, for any n; there is a set Bn of %nite strings such that (1)
A⊆ ⋃u∈Bn u and (2)
∑
u∈Bnmes(u)=
∑
u∈Bn2
−l(u)¡1=n: A set A is called e>ectively
null if there exists a sequence Bn satisfying (1) and (2) such that the set {〈u; n〉: u∈Bn}
3 For example, if a casino plays this sequence in a gambling where we can bet any amount of money
within $1 on the next term of the sequence, we shall win as much as we want after suQcient number of
moves.
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is recursively enumerable. According to Martin-L;of, a sequence in  is random if it
avoids all 4 eJectively null sets. For instance, the sequence (∗) above is not random:
indeed, it belongs to the eJectively null set of all sequences x such that x(n)= 0 for all
even n. Note that the family of all eJectively null sets is countable, as any its element
is identi%ed by an algorithm and the number of algorithms is countable.
It turns out that usual laws of probability theory, e.g., the law of large numbers
(the frequency of zeros among %rst n terms tends to 12 ) or the law of the iterated
logarithm, are satis%ed by any Martin-L;of random sequence, simply because the set
of all counterexamples can be covered by an eJectively null set. Yet the Martin-L;of
de%nition does not encounter all possible in%nite regularities which a really random
sequence should avoid. For instance, a simple diagonal construction yields a particu-
lar, de%nable Martin-L;of random sequence while our intuition refuses to accept any
de%nable sequence to be random.
The aim of our paper is to present more re%ned de%nitions of randomness, in part
known from modern set theory. We shall assume some surface acquaintance with
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory ZFC, including a belief that it is an adequate foundation of
mathematics. It will be a separate section (Section ??) which introduces some diJerent
opportunities in the study of the notion of randomness, related to invariant randomness.
2. Set theoretic approach to randomness
The Martin-L;of de%nition is an example of randomness de%nitions which describe
the “essential” null sets (i.e., those to be avoided) in terms of a %xed notion of de-
%nability. (We treat “to be a r.e. set” as a kind of de%nability.) Taking more broad
concepts of de%nability, we obtain, generally speaking, stronger notions of randomness.
For instance, one de%nes a sequence x∈ to be arithmetically random iJ it avoids
all arithmetically coded null sets (see Section ??). Then many Martin-L;of random
sequences, in particular all arithmetically de%nable among them, become arithmetically
non-random.
However, we shall still have hyperarithmetically de%nable arithmetically random
sequences. Moreover, whichever particular notion of de%nability we take, there will
be random, in this sense, sequences, de%nable in some other sense. This persuades us
to think how to incorporate the most general set theoretic de%nability as a whole. In
view of this discussion, a perfect notion (x) of a random sequence would be a notion
satisfying two principles:
(1) ZFC proves that the set of all random sequences is a full set.
(2) For any formula (x) such that ZFC proves that the set {x∈ :(x)} is null, it
is provable, in ZFC, that no random sequence satis%es (x).
(Formula means a set theoretic formula unless otherwise indicated.) However
Theorem 1. There is no formula  satisfying both (1) and (2).
4 One can consider only some particular eJectively null sets here. This restricted approach leads to notions
of chaotic, unpredictable, and stochastic sequences, see [?,?,?].
1990 B. Durand et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 1987–1996
Proof. 5 Suppose that  is such a formula.
The argument is based on ideas connected with the G;odel constructibility. G;odel
de%ned in 1938 a class L of sets called constructible sets and proved that L is a
model of ZFC. The statement that all sets are constructible is called the axiom of
constructibility and formally abbreviated by the equality V=L, where V denotes the
universe of all sets. The axiom V=L was proved to be consistent with ZFC by G;odel
(the key fact is that V=L is true in the class L) and independent from ZFC by Cohen
in 1961. 6
Here the most important property of L is that there is a well-ordering ¡L of L,
de%nable by a concrete set theoretic formula.
Let  (x) say the following: x∈ is the ¡L-least element x0 of the set {x∈∩L :
(x)}; if the latter is non-empty, and x(n)= 0 for all n otherwise. Obviously, ZFC
proves that there is only one x∈ satisfying  (x); hence, by (2), ZFC proves that
 (x) contradicts (x): However, the axiom V=L (which is consistent with ZFC)
implies, by (1), 7 that there is a sequence x satisfying (x) and  (x)—namely, the x0
de%ned above.
This drawback can be %xed at the cost of employment of non-ZFC means. This can
be, for instance, an appropriate class theory, as in [?]. Myhill (see [?]) handled the
problem adding to ZFC an extra atomic predicate of randomness and some axioms
which govern its use. Another, even more exotic opportunity is to employ a non-
standard set theory extending ZFC, to de%ne a sequence to be random iJ it avoids
any standard null set, as in Ref. [?].
However, our requirements should be moderated, as long as we keep commitment
not to leave the ZFC ground. Our proposal to this end, which seems to be a new one,
is to consider the following weaker form of principle (2):
(2′) For any formula (x), if ZFC proves the set {x :(x)} to be null, then ZFC
does not prove that there is a random sequence satisfying (x).
Informally, the principle states that no one will ever prove that a particular law
of probability theory is not satis%ed by some random sequence. In particular, any
notion of random sequence satisfying (2′) is resistant to the above critics of Martin-
L;of randomness. These are, however, not all the requirements which we %nd necessary
to impose on a notion of randomness. The point is that the principles (1) and (2′)
do not imply, that the sequence (say) 000000000000000 : : : is not random. Principle
(2′) implies, of course, that one cannot prove that it is random. But we expect that
such laws as “not to be identically zero” should be proved. This leads us to the third
principle:
5 A modi%cation of an argument by Myhill which shows that (1) is incompatible with a stronger version
of (2) saying that, for any set theoretic formula (x); ZFC proves that if the set {x∈ :(x)} is full then
all random sequences satisfy (x): The argument %rst appeared in [?, p. 321], see [?] for more on Myhill’s
approach.
6 We refer to [?,?] in matters of all general set theoretic facts used below as well as in matters of the
history of related set theoretic research.
7 We actually need only that ZFC proves the existence of at least one random sequence.
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(3) ZFC proves that any random sequence is arithmetically random, hence, Martin-L;of
random, too.
We face here the same problem: the choice of arithmetical randomness, as the bottom
level, is not well motivated. However, our construction applies to any previously spec-
i%ed amount of de%nability: for any de%nable provably countable family of provably
null sets there is a notion of randomness satisfying (1) and (2′), and such that it is
provable that any random sequence avoids all those sets.
Our main result (see Section ??) will be a notion of randomness which satis%es
(1), (2′), (3). This notion will comprise two distinct notions: the Solovay randomness
and the arithmetical randomness. The key point is that it is consistent that the Solovay
randomness satis%es both (1) and (2). This allows to de%ne the “aggregate” notion
by cases, i.e., as the Solovay randomness whenever it satis%es (1) and (2), and the
arithmetical randomness otherwise. This will result in a notion of randomness also
satisfying the common closure properties, for instance, stable with respect to %nite
changes.
3. Solovay random sequences
The aim of this section is to describe a notion of randomness which has the following
properties, apparently even stronger than those of (1) and (2), but only in the sense
of consistency:
(1∗) The set of all random sequences is a full set.
(2∗) For any formula (x); if the set {x∈ :(x)} is null then no random sequence
satis%es (x).
It immediately follows from Theorem ?? that there is no set theoretic formula which,
provably in ZFC, satis%es (1∗) and (2∗). Yet there is a notion of randomness which
consistently satis%es (1∗) and (2∗).
Recall that countable intersections of open sets are called G sets. Let us say that
a sequence of sets Bn of %nite binary sequences is a code for a G set U ⊆ iJ
U =
⋂
n
⋃
u∈Bn u; where, as above, u = {x∈ : u⊂ x}.
De%nition 2. A sequence x∈ is Solovay random over L iJ it avoids any null G
set with a code in L, the class of all G;odel constructible sets.
The formula saying that x∈ is Solovay random over L is denoted by L(x). Put
RL = {x∈ : L(x)} (all Solovay random over L sequences).
In fact, it will not be diJerent to say: whenever X ⊆ is a null Borel set with
a code in L. 8 Indeed, it is a classical fact of measure theory that any null Borel set
X ⊆ can be covered by a null G set U ⊆: The construction of the covering set
8 It would be diQcult to fully present here the involved mechanism of coding Borel subsets of . It is
based on the observation that construction of a Borel subset of  from sets of the form u, where u is a %nite
binary sequence (see Introduction) needs only countably many applications of the operations of countable
union and countable intersection. This can be adequately coded, e.g. by a sequence c∈: Sequences which
code Borel sets this way are called Borel codes. The set of all Borel codes is a co-analytic subset of .
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U can be maintained eJectively enough to show that any null Borel set coded in L
can be covered by a null G set coded in L.
It occurs that basic properties of RL depend on the structure of the set universe:
ZFC alone does not prove much, so that one either considers special models or proves
consistency theorems. In particular, it is consistent with ZFC that RL is empty, just
because RL = ∅ is a (trivial) consequence of the axiom of constructibility V=L. On
the other hand, we have
Theorem 3 (Solovay). It is consistent with ZFC that the formula L(x) satis=es both
(1∗) and (2∗).
Proof. The method of proof will be to demonstrate that L(x) satis%es (1∗) and (2∗)
in a particular model of ZFC, called the Solovay model [?].
To obtain this model, one has to %x an inaccessible cardinal # in the constructible
universe L. Then one de%nes a generic extension of L, which is a model of ZFC where
each ordinal ¡# is made countable by adding an appropriate collapse function f :N
onto = { : ¡}. The model has a lot of applications in set theory, for instance,
it is true in this model that all projective sets of sequences are Lebesgue measurable.
This result is based on the following key fact (we refer to [?,?] for proof):
Proposition 4. In the Solovay model, if a set X ⊆ is de=nable by a set theoretic
formula containing only sets in L as parameters then there is a Borel set B⊆ with
a code (see footnote 8) in L such that X ∩RL =B∩RL.
The following lemma is another key ingredient of the proof of Theorem ??.
Lemma 5. In the Solovay model, RL is a full G set.
Proof. Codes for G sets, de%ned above, can themselves be eJectively coded by se-
quences in : Thus, it suQces to prove that the set ∩L of all constructible sequences
is countable in the Solovay model.
To show this recall that ℵ1 is the least uncountable cardinal, or, that is the same,
the least cardinal bigger than ℵ0 = cardN; the countable cardinality. By ℵL1 they
denote “ℵ1 in the sense of L”, that is, the object de%ned, in L, as the least uncount-
able cardinal. Clearly ℵL1¡#; where # is the L-inaccessible cardinal which participates,
as above, in the construction of the Solovay model. It follows that ℵL1 is countable,
in the Solovay model. On the other hand, it is known that, in L, the continuum
hypothesis 2ℵ0 =ℵ1 holds; hence, sequences in ∩L admit 1–1 correspondence with
L-countable ordinals, i.e., those smaller than ℵL1 . It follows that the set ∩L is really
countable.
Thus, in the Solovay model, RL has full measure, so that every set of sequences,
de%nable by a formula with parameters in L, is a Borel set modulo a null set—hence,
it is Lebesgue measurable. (This remains true even if we allow, in addition, arbitrary
parameters in  in de%nitions of sets.) In other words, we have (1∗). We easily prove
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(2∗), too. Indeed, suppose that, in the Solovay model, X ⊆ is a null set, de%nable by
a formula containing only sets in L as parameters. By Proposition ??, we can assume
that X is a Borel null set, coded in L. It follows from observation after De%nition ??,
that X is covered by a null G set U ⊆; coded in L. However U ∩RL = ∅.
The use of the Solovay model in this proof needs to be commented upon. Recall
that the construction of this model starts with a model with an inaccessible cardinal.
It is known that the existence of such a cardinal cannot be proved in ZFC, moreover,
it implies the formal consistency of ZFC, so that a set theory with an inaccessible
cardinal is much stronger than ZFC. Therefore, it is important to %gure out whether
the existence of inaccessible cardinal can be eliminated from the proof of Theorem ??.
In many similar cases, the use of inaccessible cardinals is unavoidable (sometimes
it is very diQcult to prove this!), but in this case the Solovay model can be replaced
by a model not based on inaccessibles. One of them is a model obtained as an exten-
sion L[f] of the constructible universe L by a generic map f :N onto ℵL1 . Another
one, much more sophisticated but not using a cardinal collapse (which means that all
L-cardinals remain cardinals in the extension) is described in [?, p. 315]. (We shall
not stop at set theoretic details related to those models.) Neither of the two needs
inaccessible cardinals or anything else beyond ZFC. However, the Solovay model has
another advantage.
Indeed, consider the notion of relative standardness, which naturally arises in the
study of some probabilistic phenomena like the Fubini theorem (see [?]). This would be
a binary formula R(x; y) (reads: x is random relative to y) satisfying the two following
requirements
(1◦) If y∈ then the set {x :R(x; y)} is a full set.
(2◦) For any formula (x; y); if y∈ and the set {x∈ :(x; y)} is null then no
sequence x ∈  satis%es R(x; y) & (x; y).
For instance, let, following [?], R(x; y) be the formula saying that x∈ is Solovay
random over L[y], the class of all sets sets constructible relative to y: in other words
that x avoids any null G set with a code in L[y]. A minor modi%cation of the proof
of Theorem ?? shows that it is consistent with ZFC that this formula R satis%es both
(1◦) and (2◦), and in fact R satis%es (1◦) and (2◦) in the Solovay model. However,
unlike the “simple” randomness above, it is not known whether the consistency of (1◦)
and (2◦) can be established on the base of ZFC alone. (This problem was formulated
in [?].)
4. The “consistent” randomness
Recall that a code for a G set is, as de%ned in Section ??, essentially a subset of
S×N; where S is the set of all %nite binary sequences. Let us %x a recursive bijection
 :S×N onto N. Say that a G code C is arithmetically de=nable iJ its -image c is
an arithmetical subset of N in the ordinary sense, i.e., it can be de%ned by a formula
written in terms of addition and multiplication, with quanti%ers over natural numbers.
Let us say that a set G⊆ is an arithmetically coded G set iJ it has an arithmetically
de%nable code.
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De%nition 6. A sequence x∈ is an arithmetically random iJ it avoids any
null arithmetically coded G set. 9 The formula saying that x∈ is arithmetically
random is denoted by A(x) Put RA = {x∈ : A(x)} (all arithmetically random
sequences).
One easily proves, in ZFC, that RL⊆RA, or, in other words, L(x) implies A(x).
Unlike RL, the set RA is, provably in ZFC, a set of full measure. Clearly any
Martin-L;of random sequence x∈ belongs to RA.
Let (x) be the formula saying:
• x∈RA, and if RL is a set of full measure then x∈RL.
Thus  de%nes the set RL of all Solovay random sequences over L—provided this
is a set of full measure, while otherwise it de%nes simply the set RA of all arith-
metically random sequences. It easily follows that  satis%es (1) and (3). To see
that (x) also satis%es (2′), consider a set theoretic formula (x) such that ZFC
proves that it de%nes a null set. By Theorem ??, it is consistent with ZFC that
L satis%es (1*) and (2*) hence (x)⇔ L(x). It follows that ∀x ((x)⇒¬(x))
also is consistent, so that ZFC does not prove that there is a random sequence x
satisfying (x).
5. Invariant randomness
Any reasonable notion of randomness of a sequence in  (including those considered
above) informally amounts to the requirement that the sequence cannot include in%nite
regularities of some kind. What happens if we do not mind to allow “small” in%nite
regularities? Let is make a few steps in this direction.
Let I be an ideal on N whose elements (subsets of N) will be thought of as “small”
in%nite sets. The following examples are of interest:
Fin = all %nite subsets of N;
D= all density 0 subsets of N:
(A set X ⊆N is of density 0 iJ the frequency of elements of X among %rst n natural
numbers tends to 0 as n tends to ∞.) De%ne EI to be the associated equivalence
relation on , so that x EI y iJ the set {n : x(n) =y(n)} belongs to I : informally, x and
y “diJer not too much” from each other.
Note that EFin is usually denoted by E0.
If E is an equivalence relation on  then let [x]E= {y :y E x} (the E-class of x∈)
and [X ]E= {y :∃ x∈X (y E x)} and ]X [E=C[CX ]E (the E-saturation and the E-kernel
of X ⊆; CX is the complement of X , as usual). Any set X satisfying X = [X ]E is
called E-invariant.
9 A weaker notion of n randomness was proposed in [?] (the code should be in n). It can be proved that
arithmetical randomness is equivalent to uncompressibility when computations are relativised to arithmetical
oracles.
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Let us take the arithmetical randomness as the basic notion, but the following de%-
nition makes sense for any other one (e.g., the Solovay randomness).
De%nition 7. Let E be an equivalence relation on . A sequence x∈ is arithmeti-
cally E-invariant random iJ it avoids any set of the form ]X [E, where X is a null
arithmetically coded G set.
(It is not clear that this is equivalent to the requirement that x avoids any null
E-invariant arithmetically coded G set: note that ]X [E may be not Borel, even assuming
that E; X are Borel.) The de%nition makes sense formally for any equivalence relation
E, but lacks motivation if E is not of the form EI . 10
Then “arithmetically random” is clearly the same as “arithmetically = invariant ran-
dom” (the equality can be considered as an equivalence relation). Moreover, this is the
same as “arithmetically E0-invariant random”, because the E0-saturation [X ]E0 of any
set X is the union of countably many simple shifts of X . On the other hand, the case
of ED is diJerent!
Indeed, the set of all arithmetically ED-invariant random sequences is clearly
ED-invariant. It follows that there is an arithmetically ED-invariant random sequence
x such that x(2n)= 0 for all n: note that the set {2n : n∈!} belongs to D! Such
an x is not arithmetically random, of course. Thus, arithmetically random sequences
form a proper subclass of arithmetically ED-invariant random ones. In fact, for any
arithmetically random x there exist many arithmetically ED-invariant random but not
arithmetically random sequences y ED x. We would be interested to know if any arith-
metically ED-invariant random y satis%es y ED x for some arithmetically random x.
Another question is how the known forms of relationship between ideals over N
reYect in the associated notions of invariant randomness.
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